Abstract Several recent studies suggest that individual subjective survival forecasts are powerful predictors of both mortality and behavior. Using 15 years of longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement Study, I present an alternative view. Across a wide range of ages, predictions of in-sample mortality rates based on subjective forecasts are substantially less accurate than predictions based on population life tables. Subjective forecasts also fail to capture fundamental properties of senescence, including increases in yearly mortality rates with age. To shed light on the mechanisms underlying these biases, I develop and estimate a latent-factor model of how individuals form subjective forecasts. The estimates of this model's parameters imply that these forecasts incorporate several important sources of measurement error that arguably swamp the useful information they convey.
Introduction
Mortality expectations play a central role in individual decision-making. A host of behavioral models in economics and finance posit that mortality forecasts influence retirement planning, savings, portfolio choice, human capital accumulation, and investments in health. In spite of the importance of mortality forecasts, social scientists have not had access to individual-level data on these measures until recently. As a result, their usefulness for predicting mortality and behavior is largely unknown, both in absolute terms and relative to actuarial estimates based on published life tables.
In addition to their influence on individual decisions, mortality expectations also shape public policy, particularly the design of age-based entitlement programs, such as Social Security and Medicare. Predictions of future mortality rates have taken center stage in the public debate about the future of these programs, with a loose consensus emerging that public expenditures will soar as age-specific mortality rates continue to fall (Leonhardt 2011) . Although accurate mortality projections are essential for designing policy, mortality rates have been remarkably difficult to predict historically. As Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) documented, past forecasts of mortality improvements have been systematically and substantially conservative. Most demographers project that mortality will continue to decline in the foreseeable future (Olshansky et al. (2005) is a notable exception), but there is little consensus about this projected decline's speed or magnitude. In an attempt to uncover additional sources of information that can potentially be useful to demographers in forming aggregate mortality forecasts, recent authors (e.g., Hurd and McGarry 2002; Perozek 2008) have explored the accuracy and validity of individual-level mortality forecasts obtained from survey data.
This study investigates the predictive power of subjective survival forecasts (SSFs) drawn from several cohorts of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a longitudinal survey of Americans over the age of 50. I analyze forecasts of the likelihood of surviving to a range of "target ages," with a focus on how these measures predict actual survival and how they evolve over time in response to new information. Unlike previous empirical studies of SSFs, my analyses make use of two unique features of the 2006 wave of the HRS. First, 2006 is the first year that original HRS respondents reach any of their target ages. The oldest members of the HRS cohort were 61 years old in the initial 1992 survey, which included questions about the likelihood of surviving to age 75-that is, until approximately 2006. Therefore, data from the 2006 wave enable me to compare insample survival rates with subjective forecasts without imposing parametric assumptions on the shape of subjective survival curves. Second, subsamples of respondents to the 2006 wave answered detailed questions designed to gauge the reliability of their forecasts and to assess their knowledge of population life tables. I use responses to these questions to shed light on how individuals form SSFs and how they use new information to revise SSFs.
A large body of research has found strong links between SSFs and actual mortality. Hurd and McGarry (1995) and Manski (2004) showed that forecasts are correlated with behaviors that affect mortality, such as tobacco usage and regular exercise, and others found that forecasts predict in-sample mortality in short panels of the HRS (see, e.g., Hurd and McGarry 2002) . Perhaps no study has produced more persuasive evidence of the predictive power of SSFs than that of Perozek (2008) , which found that discrepancies between SSFs and published cohort life tables in 1992 actually predicted future revisions to the life tables. Specifically, men in the 1992 wave of the HRS were optimistic about their survival prospects relative to life tables, but women were pessimistic; in 2004, the Social Security Actuary revised the cohort life tables, raising estimates of male life expectancy while lowering estimates for women. Perozek (2008) interpreted the Actuary's revision as compelling evidence that individual SSFs predict future mortality rates better than life tables do.
In contrast to the findings of these previous studies, I present evidence that SSFs are only negligibly informative about future mortality rates. Across a wide range of ages in the HRS, predictions of in-sample survival based on SSFs are far less accurate than predictions based on population life tables. The SSFs systematically understate the likelihood of living to relatively young ages (such as age 75) while overstating the likelihood of surviving to ages 85 and beyond. I show that these forecast errors are consistent with the notion that at a given point in time, individuals do not recognize that yearly death rates increase with age, a fundamental pattern of senescence.
In light of the systematic biases apparent in the SSFs, I develop and estimate a latentfactor model of how individuals form subjective forecasts. A key feature of this model involves the relationship between SSFs and cohort subjective survival forecasts (CSSFs), which are individuals' beliefs about the survival prospects of others of their age and gender, assessed in the 2006 wave of the HRS. The resulting estimates suggest that the discrepancies between the SSFs and actuarial forecasts arise primarily from noise in the SSFs, which accounts for substantially more of the across-respondent variation in the SSFs than do differences across individuals in actual survival prospects. The estimates also imply that individuals' beliefs about others' chances of survival exhibit the same biases found in the SSFs; for example, the CSSFs also systematically understate the likelihood of living to relatively young ages while overstating the likelihood of surviving to relatively old ages.
In the following section, I describe the HRS, with a focus on the various subjective survival measures available in these data. In the third section, I study the relationship between SSFs and in-sample survival in the HRS. Next, I develop and test an explanation for the systematic bias in SSFs, based on the notion that at a point in time, individuals do not appear to realize that their own yearly mortality rates will steadily increase as they age. The fifth section presents the latent-factor model of individual and cohort subjective survival forecasts, and the last section concludes with a research agenda.
Subjective Survival Forecasts in the Health and Retirement Study
The HRS is a panel study of four different cohorts in the United States. The original HRS cohort, a nationally representative sample of the noninstitutionalized population born between 1931 and 1941, was initially interviewed in 1992, with follow-up interviews every two years thereafter. A separate study, the Asset and Health Dynamics Study (AHEAD), began in 1993 as a sample of those born before 1924. In 1998, the two studies were combined, and two additional cohorts were added to the sampling design. The Children of the Depression (CODA) cohort filled the sevenyear age gap between the original HRS and AHEAD cohorts by targeting those born between 1924 and 1930, and the War Baby (WB) cohort targeted those born between 1942 and 1947. From 1998 forward, the HRS sampling frame includes all four cohorts, representing the population of Americans over age 50 who do not live in institutional settings, such as nursing homes.
1 The HRS has also included oversamples of African Americans, Hispanics, and Florida residents since its inception, and spouses and domestic partners of target respondents are also interviewed.
For the purposes of this study, the key components of the HRS are responses to variants of the following question: "On a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 is no chance and 100 is absolutely certain, what are the chances that you will live to age X or older?" Respondents younger than 65 are asked this question for X 0 75 in all waves and for X 0 85 in the 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2006 waves. I denote individuals' responses to these questions as P 75 and P 85 , respectively (I suppress individual subscripts to economize on notation). Respondents aged 65 and older answer a separate question about the likelihood of living roughly another 11 to 15 years. Specifically, those aged 65 to 69 are asked about the likelihood of surviving to age 80, those aged 70 to 74 are asked about the likelihood of surviving to age 85, and so on. I denote these 11-to 15-year ahead forecasts as P 11 . Do Subjective Survival Forecasts Predict Future Mortality Rates? Table 1 presents averages of P 75 and P 85 by gender and survey wave for all HRS respondents aged 50 to 65, along with the corresponding averages implied by each year's Vital Statistics period life tables published by the National Center for Health Statistics. Relative to the life tables, in 1992, men held relatively accurate expectations about the likelihood of survival to age 75, but women were pessimistic: the averages of P 75 were 62.53 for men and 65.80 for women, compared with 61.30 and 74.45, respectively, according to the life tables. Note that period life tables do not capture the actual mortality profile facing any cohort if age-specific mortality rates vary over time. In fact, the steady decline in age-specific mortality rates in the United States since 1992 implies that the 1992 life tables understate actual survival probabilities, making the pessimism among women even more surprising.
2 I weight data after 1992 to generate constant gender-specific age distributions across survey waves. This procedure has the effect of standardizing all later years' age distributions to match that found in the 1992 survey.
. A researcher might use year t life tables to compute a probability of living to age S conditional on reaching age R as ) . As an example, one might calculate the probability that a person aged 60 in 1992 lives to age 62 by multiplying the 1992 one-year survival rate for those aged 60 by the 1992 one-year survival rate for those aged 61. This will understate the true two-year survival rate if the probability of living to age 62 conditional on reaching age 61 increases between 1992 and 1993. More generally, survival probabilities based on a given year's life tables will understate the true probability of survival to age x if age-specific survival probabilities increase over time. 3 Among respondents of gender g in year t, the sample fraction that is age x is Pr(age 0 x | g, t inconsistent with this interpretation. Among women, the 1992 average of P 75 is much lower than the average based on 1992 life tables, which is consistent with a belief that age-specific death rates would sharply increase after 1992. In reality, death rates steadily declined during this period for both men and women. Additionally, neither gender's forecasts of survival to age 75 increased from 1992 to 2006. For men, the average of P 75 declined from 62.53 to 59.10 (this decline is statistically significant at conventional levels; t 0 4.51), even though actual death rates were falling steadily. As a result, the downward bias in individual forecasts has grown over time. A literal interpretation of subjective forecasts as predictions of future mortality implies that in 2006, both men and women anticipated substantial increases in future death rates at ages below 75. Panel B of Table 1 presents average values of P 85 in the 1992-1998 and 2006 waves. In contrast to panel A, men are optimistic about their prospects for survival in all years. Women are neither systematically optimistic nor pessimistic, with higher survival forecasts than implied by life tables in three of the five years. As in panel A, average SSFs remained roughly constant over this period in spite of increases in actuarial survival rates, particularly for men. In all years, men and women's SSFs imply much flatter survival profiles than those based on life tables; this pattern is easiest to see for 2006 male respondents, who substantially underpredict P 75 and overpredict P 85 .
Men's optimistic forecasts of P 85 in 1992, which are seemingly prescient because of the ensuing increase in actuarial survival rates from 26.99 % to 32.74 %, are the principal mechanisms driving Perozek's interpretation that men accurately forecasted Notes: All forecasts are converted to a 0-100 scale, with 0 meaning "no chance" and 100 meaning "absolutely certain." Observations in all years after 1992 are weighted in order to match the 1992 age distribution of respondents within each gender.
increases in their life expectancy. However, a strict interpretation of men's subjective forecasts as predictions of future survival rates again implies an unusual prediction: the stability of the average of P 85 from 1992 to 2006 implies that men aged 50 to 65 in 2006 are no more likely to survive to age 85 than those aged 50 to 65 in 1992. Such stagnation would represent an abrupt end to a steady decline in mortality rates that has lasted for more than a century. 4 Although I cannot evaluate this prediction using current data, I can directly assess the accuracy of SSFs by analyzing HRS sample members' own mortality experiences.
Subjective Survival Forecasts and In-Sample Survival in the HRS
As noted earlier, several previous studies have analyzed in-sample survival rates in the HRS, finding that measures such as P 75 and P 85 predict survival from 1992 to 1994 (Hurd and McGarry 2002) and from 1992 to 1998 (Hurd et al. 2004) . Recent releases of the data provide an opportunity to evaluate subjective forecasts more closely because some individuals have reached the target ages of their forecasts. Specifically, for AHEAD cohort members aged 74, 79, and 84 in 1993, the P 11 target age corresponded to a survivor's actual age in 2004.
5 Similarly, for the oldest HRS cohort members, who were aged 65 in 1996, P 75 measures the likelihood of surviving to 2006. As a result, assessing the accuracy of subjective probabilities nonparametrically is now possible, without specifying a functional form of the underlying hazard function.
Figure 1 presents age-specific averages of P 75 for those aged 60 to 65 in the 1996 HRS and of P 11 for those aged 70 to 85 in the 1993 AHEAD, with both series labeled as Subjective Forecasts. The gap in the series between ages 65 and 70 reflects the gap in the age coverage of the original HRS and AHEAD cohorts.
6 Fig. 1 also includes predicted survival rates to the target ages based on "initial-year" life tables (1996 for the original HRS cohort and 1993 for the AHEAD cohort) and "target-year" life tables (2006 for the HRS and 2004 for the AHEAD), as well as the actual survival rates as of the target year based on HRS coding of respondents' vital status. The sawtooth patterns of both series based on life tables reflect the discontinuities in target ages between initial ages 74 and 75, 79 and 80, and 84 and 85. Table 6 in the appendix provides the values of all four series for each initial age.
As Fig. 1 shows, survival rates steadily declined in initial age. Approximately 61 % of respondents aged 70 in 1993 survived until 2004, compared with only 29 % of those aged 80. Importantly, the in-sample survival curve lies between the curves based on the two life tables at the initial ages of 65, 74, 79, and 84, which are the initial ages at which surviving respondents reach the target age in the target year (vertical lines denote these initial ages in Fig. 1 ). This pattern implies that population life tables are remarkably accurate in predicting in-sample survival, reflecting that the HRS and AHEAD samples are nationally representative: population survival rates between years t and t + k will lie between those predicted by year t and year t + k life tables if death rates monotonically decrease overtime. At other initial ages, the survival curve is typically higher than the life table curves because survivors have not yet reached their target age. For example, an individual aged 70 in 1993 has reached age 81 in 2004, but both the actuarial and subjective forecasts refer to survival to age 85. Figure 1 also shows that the SSFs perform poorly in predicting in-sample survival. Specifically, SSFs understate survival by approximately 11 percentage points among those aged 65 in the 1996 HRS but substantially overstate survival for those aged 80 and older. The survival rate among 84-year-olds is less than one-fourth as high as the survival rate among 65-year-olds (18 % vs. 78 % ), but the former group's average SSF is more than one-half as large as the latter's (36 % vs. 67 % ). By this metric, the SSFs are less than one-half as steep with respect to age as are actual survival rates-a phenomenon I describe later in the article as "flatness bias." Note that I pool data from both genders in producing Fig. 1 (and in all upcoming analyses), but gender-specific SSFs are also substantially flatter than the corresponding in-sample survival rates. In-sample survival rates and probabilities of survival to target ages, as implied by life tables and subjective forecasts. "Target ages" for subjective and life-table forecasts refer to the age to which respondents report their subjective probability of surviving; these target ages equal 75 for respondents age 65 and younger, 85 for those ages 70-74, 90 for those ages 75-79, 95 for those ages 80-84, and 100 for those age 85. The initial waves of the HRS/AHEAD did not include primary respondents older than 65 and younger than 70, resulting in the "gap" in all four series between those ages. See the third section of the article for more details.
As further evidence on the relative predictive power of SSFs and life tables, Table 2 presents estimates from individual-level probit models of survival to the target year as a function of the initial-year SSFs and actuarial forecasts based on initial-year life tables. Column 1 shows estimated marginal effects from specifications in which the estimation samples include all respondents who, if they survived, would have reached their target age by the target year: those aged 65 in 1996, and those aged 74, 79, and 84 in 1993. The coefficient on the subjective forecast is 0.144, implying that a 1-percentage-point increase in SSFs is associated with only a 0.144-percentagepoint increase in actual survival. 7 In contrast, actual survival mirrors variation in life table-based forecasts almost exactly: a 1-percentage-point increase in the life table forecast is associated with a 1.055-percentage-point increase in actual survival (this estimate is statistically indistinguishable from 1).
Column 2 of Table 2 adds controls for respondents' marital status, race, ethnicity, living arrangements, assets, income, education, and body mass index. For space considerations, I do not report the effects of these controls in Table 2 , but the two factors with the strongest effects on survival are household living arrangements and education: a respondent living with a partner is roughly 7 percentage points more likely to survive than one who lives alone, and college graduates are roughly 8 percentage points more likely to survive than those who did not complete high school. In contrast, gender does not significantly affect survival in these models, since the inclusion of the actuarial forecasts captures the female longevity advantage. Most importantly for the present purposes, the inclusion of these controls does not substantially change the coefficients on either the subjective or the actuarial forecasts.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 show estimates from models in which the estimation sample includes all initial-year respondents: that is, all HRS cohort members aged 65 and younger in 1996 and all AHEAD cohort members aged 70 or older in 1993. These models again show that the actuarial forecasts are much more predictive of survival than are the SSFs. 8 The marginal effects of the actuarial forecasts are approximately 1 in all specifications. I return to this issue in the upcoming section in which I consider why actuarial forecasts predict survival better than do SSFs in the context of a latent factor model of survival beliefs.
Taken together, Fig. 1 and Tables 1 and 2 provide strong evidence that SSFs do not predict group-level mortality as well as population life tables do, in contrast to the conclusions of Perozek (2008) . SSFs in 1992 did not predict future changes in mortality rates, and they became steadily less accurate over time. More importantly, SSFs are flatter with respect to age than are actuarial forecasts and in-sample survival rates, implying that individuals systematically understate their chances of surviving to 7 By comparison, Hurd and McGarry (2002) estimated that a 1-percentage-point increase in the SSFs is associated with a 0.016-percentage-point increase in the likelihood of actually surviving from Wave 1 to Wave 2 of the HRS. This estimate is much smaller than that found here for two reasons. First, Hurd and McGarry's (2002) dependent variable captures survival over only a two-year period, compared with up to 14 years in the models considered earlier. Second, their sample includes only those younger than 65 in Wave 1. As a result, the probability of death in their estimation sample was roughly 1.7 % , compared with 53 % in the sample used in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 , and 27 % in the sample used in columns 3 and 4. 8 The estimates shown in Table 2 are not necessarily inconsistent with the findings of authors such as Smith et al. (2001) , who argued that SSFs are useful for predicting individual variation in mortality. Conditional on a respondent's age and gender, SSFs are more informative than forecasts based on life tables by definition because published life table values are constant within age-gender cells.
relatively young ages and overstate their chances of surviving to relatively old ages. This flatness bias may largely stem from the fact that individuals report their own probabilities of survival, rather than estimates of the survival prospects of their cohort. 9 In this article's penultimate section, I evaluate this possibility by analyzing cohort subjective survival forecasts directly, but I first turn to the importance for flatness bias of the apparent inability of individuals to understand that mortality risk increases with age.
Do Survey Respondents Recognize That Death Rates Increase With Age?
The flatness bias in subjective survival forecasts is not unique to HRS respondents; Hamermesh (1985) documented a similar phenomenon in a sample of economists from the early 1980s. Mirowsky (1999) also found that optimism about survival increased with age in the Aging, Status, and the Sense of Control survey.
10 As Hamermesh (1985) noted, flatness bias is surprising if SSFs represent rational extrapolations of current life tables into the future. Specifically, if respondents anticipate future increases in survival rates, young respondents' subjective forecasts should be "optimistic" relative to current life tables, and this relative optimism will decline with age. As a result, SSFs should be steeper with respect to age than are actuarial forecasts, in contrast to the flatness bias apparent in the HRS. Notes: The entries in each column are marginal effects from probit models of within-sample survival in the HRS as a function of subjective and life table-based survival forecasts. Columns 2 and 4 include additional controls for marital status, race, ethnicity, living arrangements, assets, income, education, and body mass index (BMI). Standard errors, given in parentheses, are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity.
9 Although it is unlikely that respondents consult life tables when thinking about their own survival prospects, this information is publically available; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention provides detailed age-and gender-specific population life tables on its website (http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/ life_tables.htm). 10 In describing possible reasons why optimism increases with age, Mirowsky (1999:978) speculated that ". . . the simplest explanation is that continuing survival encourages greater optimism at older ages because it seems increasingly remarkable."
Here I present an explanation for flatness bias based on the hypothesis that individuals, at a given point in time, do not recognize that yearly death rates increase with age.
11 Consider a discrete-time model of mortality in which the probability that an individual aged x dies before reaching age x + 1 is denoted as q x . The probability of surviving to age x 2 given survival until age x 1 is given by .
If age-specific death rates are constant at the rate q, then this expression simplifies to 
For example, for a person aged 65, the probability of surviving to age 75 equals (1 -q) 10 , and the probability of surviving to age 85 is (1 -q) 20 , so that 
Equation (4) forms the basis of a test of the hypothesis that individuals, at a given point in time, believe that yearly death rates are constant with respect to age, which is referred to hereafter as the "constant hazard hypothesis." To operationalize this test, I estimate the following linear model:
where j indexes ages from 50 to 65, D ij denotes a vector of dummy variables (one for each age j) that each equal 1 when age i 0 j and zero otherwise, and u i represents individual variation in log(P 85 ) that is unrelated to log(P 75 ). 12 The constant 11 Distinguishing this phenomenon is important, which is apparent among individuals of a given age forecasting their survival prospects to two different points in the future, from changes in forecasts over time for an individual. This latter source of variation does imply that individuals recognize, over time, that death rates increase with age. I return to this distinction at the end of this section. 12 The use of a logarithmic specification introduces problems when P 75 and/or P 85 equal 0. In practice, I set P 85 equal to 0.01 when P 75 is positive but P 85 equals 0. I drop observations for which both P 75 and P 85 equal 0, but the results presented in Table 3 ) 2 ] is nonnegative, which implies weakly decreasing yearly death rates with age. For example, a 65-year-old man who reports P 75 0 .8 and P 85 0 .7, so that [P 85 -(P 75 ) 2 ] 0 .06, believes that his 10-year-ahead survival probability is 80 % at age 65 and 87.5 % (0 .7 / .8) at age 75. Among 65-yearolds, the mean value of [P 85 - (P 75 ) 2 ] is -.04, which is statistically indistinguishable from zero (p 0 .19). Table 3 presents evidence about the constant hazard hypothesis based on estimates of Eq. (5). Column 1 of Table 3 shows estimates of β j from OLS regressions for j 0 50, 55, and all ages from 60 to 65. (Results for other ages, excluded to economize on space, are available upon request.) A 1 % increase in P 75 is associated with a Notes: The entries in each column are the age-specific coefficients and associated standard errors (in parentheses) from linear regressions of log(P 85 ) on log(P 75 ) interacted with an exhaustive set of indicator variables for an individual's age, as given in Eq. (5) in the article. For example, the entries in the top row are estimates of β 50 from Eq. (5). The rescaled OLS models in column 2 are estimated by two-sample instrumental variables (TSIV), as described in the article. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the respondent level and to arbitrary heteroskedasticity.
1.17 % increase in P 85 among 50-year-old respondents, with a standard error of 0.09. The corresponding value implied by the constant hazard hypothesis is 1.40, as shown in column 3. In column 4, P 75 and P 85 are taken from the relevant year's life tables rather than from the subjective forecasts. The estimate of 2.33 is substantially larger than that implied by the constant hazard hypothesis, reflecting that death rates increase with age in the population. The remaining estimates of β j in column 1 of Table 3 are all significantly smaller than the corresponding values implied by the constant hazard hypothesis. Again, these patterns suggest that individuals believe that death rates decrease with age. By contrast, the estimates in column 4 are substantially larger than those in column 3, and they increase with the age of the respondents. At age 65, the estimate in column 1 is 1.12, compared with 3.03 in column 4.
The overall patterns of Table 3 suggest that at a given point in time, HRS respondents fail to understand that mortality rates increase with age. In fact, they imply that respondents believe that mortality rates decrease with age; specifically, those younger than 65 appear to believe that annual death rates are higher at ages younger than 75 than at ages between 75 and 85. I am wary to accept this interpretation at face value, though, because measurement error might play a pivotal role in producing the estimates in Table 3 . Such measurement error plays a prominent role in previous research on SSFs, particularly in the context of "focal responses," which are forecasts of exactly 0, 50, or 100 % (see, e.g., Gan et al. 2005; Kézdi and Willis 2003; Lillard and Willis 2001) . Unlike reporting error in an objectively measured variable, the concept of error in subjective forecasts is unintuitive because the definition of the underlying "true" value of the variable is not straightforward; for example, it is difficult to characterize an individual's true belief about his own survival prospects if it differs from what he reports in a survey.
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Although defining measurement error in subjective data is difficult, demonstrating its existence is relatively straightforward. For example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) showed that subjective responses vary substantially across repeated questions spaced closely together in time. The 2006 wave of the HRS provides an opportunity to use such variability as a measure of the error in subjective data. Specifically, a 10 % random sample responded to a supplemental data module that included the question, "What are the chances you will live to age X?," which is identical to P 75 for those younger than 65 and identical to P 11 for those aged 70 and older. As a result, respondents in this subsample provided two comparable SSFs over the course of the approximately hour-long interview.
To use the repeated forecasts to analyze the role of measurement error, consider a model in which the logarithm of reported survival forecasts, log (P 75 ), equals one's true belief about longevity, log(P 75 ) * , plus error (ε) that possibly 13 A large experimental literature examines the sensitivity of survey responses to various factors, including the phrasing of questions, the order in which questions are asked, and interviewer cues on the social desirability of particular responses. This literature finds that subjective survey responses are particularly sensitive to these factors, possibly because subjective beliefs cannot be verbalized and may not even exist in a coherent form. Tanur (1992) and Sudman et al. (1996) provide excellent reviews of the experimental evidence.
reflects an inability to verbalize this belief. 
where log ðP 75 Þ i1 denotes an individual's response to the full-sample HRS question, and log ðP 75 Þ i2 represents the same individual's response in the supplemental module. Under the classical measurement error assumptions that ε i1 and ε i2 are orthogonal to each other and to the true beliefs, the slope coefficient from a simple regression of log(P 75 ) i2 on log(P 75 ) i1 converges to , which is the fraction of the variance of log(P 75 ) i1 that reflects the variance in the true beliefs. Importantly, this ratio also represents the extent to which measurement error attenuateŝ , β j OLS , the OLS estimate of β j based on Eq. (5):
Based on the 587 individuals with valid responses for both log(P 75 ) i1 and log (P 75 ) i2 in 2006, the estimate of is 0.714 (0.025), implying that the estimates in column 1 of Table 3 are biased downward by 28.6 %. Therefore, in column 2, I report rescaled estimates of β j that are the OLS estimates in column 1 divided by 0.714. 14 These rescaled estimates are larger than the estimates in column 1 by construction, but they still provide little evidence that respondents understand that death rates increase with age. In particular, they are insignificantly different from the values in column 3 among those younger than 60 and significantly smaller than the values in column 3 for those aged 62 to 65.
In summary, the results of Table 3 imply that SSFs are poor predictors of aggregate survival partly because survey respondents, at a point in time, do not understand that death rates increase with age. As a result, they overstate the likelihood of dying at young ages while understating the likelihood of dying at relatively old ages. At first glance, this hypothesis appears inconsistent with the patterns in Fig. 1 , which shows that 11-to 15-year-ahead SSFs decline with age: that is, that subjective mortality risk increases with age. However, these two sets of findings stem from two different sources of variation in SSFs. The first involves variation across target ages for a particular individual at a given age below 66, and the second involves variation across individuals of different ages, many of whom are in their 70s and 80s. The discrepancy implies that individuals learn that mortality risk increases with age as they age. In auxiliary analyses, I find additional evidence in support of this inference: estimates from models of SSFs as a function of age and individual-specific fixed effects indicate that SSFs to a given target age decline with age. 15 The failure of SSFs to capture one of the most basic properties of actuarial survival estimates-that they increase in age for a given target age-likely reflects that individuals receive new health information over time, which causes them to revise their survival forecasts downward. In light of this failure, I turn next to describing more formally how individuals form their SSFs and how these forecasts evolve in response to new information.
A Model of Individual and Cohort Subjective Survival Forecasts
The results thus far have hinted at the underlying relationships between SSFs and actuarial survival forecasts. In this section, I explicitly model these relationships in order to shed light on how individuals think about their chances of survival, how they report these beliefs to interviewers, and how these beliefs might differ from how they think about others' chances of survival. To do so, I first consider a source of information found only in the 2006 wave of the HRS.
Cohort Subjective Survival Forecasts: Can Individuals Predict Others' Deaths?
In 2006, a supplemental module administered to 10 % of HRS respondents included a question designed to measure their knowledge of population life tables: "Out of a group of 100 [men/women] your age, how many do you think will survive to the age of X?" The target age X equals 75 for those younger than 65 and equals the P 11 target age for those aged 65 and older. These cohort subjective survival forecasts (CSSFs) are positively related to individuals' own SSFs, with a simple correlation of .30 (t 0 8.64). Both sets of forecasts are positively correlated with actuarial forecasts: the estimated slope from a simple regression of CSSFs on actuarial forecasts is 0.68 (t 0 25.03), and the estimated slope from a simple regression of SSFs on actuarial forecasts in the same sample is 0.48 (t 0 12.48). Figure 2 shows age-specific averages of CSSFs, SSFs, and actuarial survival estimates for the 1,348 supplemental module respondents. Note that the CSSFs exhibit the same flatness bias as the SSFs, with the CSSF curve lying far below the actuarial estimates at relatively young ages but lying slightly above the actuarial estimates at ages above 80. The CSSF curve appears to be essentially a "shifted down" version of the SSF curve, reflecting that respondents' own survival forecasts are, on average, 9.3 percentage points higher than their CSSFs. cohort subjective survival forecast, CSSF i , can be written as the sum of A i , his error in guessing A i (denoted as g i ), and an additional component, , which can be interpreted as a random error that captures his inability to precisely express his beliefs to an interviewer. This last component is analogous to the "measurement error" in subjective forecasts described in the preceding section. Similarly, SSF i can be written as the sum of A i , g i , and two additional components. The first, d i , represents the individual's true deviation from A i . The second, e i , represents both the individual's random error in guessing d i and his inability to express this quantity. The SSFs and CSSFs can then be written as
In practice, I assume that the error components e i and v i are orthogonal. I do not make the same restriction about g i and d i because it is plausible that individuals "project" their own survival prospects onto their CSSFs, inducing correlation between g i and d i . To capture this possibility, I model both g i and d i as a function of a latent factor θ i :
where is a standard normal random factor, and λ d and λ g are factor loadings.
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The joint distribution of SSF i and CSSF i is not sufficient to identify the components of the model described by Eqs. (8) and (9). There are four unknown parameters 16 This structure allows for positive, negative, or zero correlation between g i and d i . Specifically, (λ d , λ g , var(e i ), and var(v i ) but only three observable second moments (var(SSF i ), var (CSSF i ), and cov(SSF i , CSSF i )). Fortunately, the 2006 wave of the HRS contains another unique source of information that can help to identify these components: "revised" subjective survival forecasts. Specifically, after a respondent reveals his CSSF (which is essentially his guess of A i ), the interviewer tells him the true value of A i , based on 2003 life tables: "Now, suppose I told you that according to statistics, on average about [#] out of 100 [men/women] your age should live to age X." After giving the respondent this information, the interviewer then asks the respondent for a revised SSF, using the same target ages as before. I denote this revised forecast as RSSF i . Like SSF i , RSSF i is modeled as the sum of A i , d i , and an error that represents random error in guessing d i and the inability to express d i to an interviewer (u i ). Unlike SSF i , however, RSSF i does not incorporate error in guessing A i because respondents have just learned the value of A i .
With the inclusion of the equation for RSSF i , the model becomes 
Under the assumption that the response error u i is orthogonal to all other components of the model, the six observed second moments can be written as follows: 
SSF RSSF A CSSF RSSF
These six equations are functions of five unknown parameters (λ d , λ g , var(e i ), var(v i ), and var(u i )), so this system does not have an exact solution. Therefore, I estimate the parameters by minimizing the sum (across the six equations) of the squared differences between the theoretical and observed variances and covariances.
17 I bootstrap all standard errors based on 500 replicate samples drawn with replacement from the original estimation sample. Table 4 presents the estimates of this latent factor model. The first two columns list the observed second moments involving the three forecasts. The variance of the SSFs is larger than the variance of the CSSFs because the SSFs incorporate information about an individual's own health and survival (d i ). Note also that the variance of the revised SSFs is much smaller than the variance of the SSFs, consistent with the view that some of the variation in the SSFs stems from uncertainty about cohort survival; when respondents learn A i , their beliefs about their own survival become more precise. The second set of columns presents the estimated parameters. The estimate of λ d is 16.68 (0.85), which implies that the estimated variance of d i is 278.21 (28.15) . Similarly, the estimate of λ g is 7.06 (0.94), which implies that the estimated variance of g i is 49.86 (30.21) . The estimates of the other components illustrate that response errors play important roles in all of the subjective forecasts. Specifically, the estimate of var(e i ) is 361.10 (31.70), substantially larger than the estimate of var(d i ). This implies that relative to actuarial survival estimates, the SSFs add more noise (represented by e i ) than genuine individual-specific information about health and survival prospects (represented by d i ). In fact, the variation in d i represents only 34.48 % of the total variation in SSFs, net of variation in actuarial survival rates. The remaining variation is due to e i , g i , and the factor θ i , which influences both d i and g i . Similarly, the estimated variance of v i is 379.23 (23.28), which is striking because it implies that nearly 83 % (0 379.23 / 458.84) of the variance of CSSF i reflects errors in expressing probabilities. This is perhaps not surprising given that the between-respondent variance of A i is 29.73, or only 6.48 % of the variance of CSSF i .
Overall, the estimated parameters reinforce the notion that individuals' subjective survival forecasts incorporate a substantial amount of noise. This noise includes uncertainty about one's own survival prospects, uncertainty about the survival prospects of one's cohort, and measurement error that reflects an inability to express these quantities Notes: The estimation sample includes all 2006 HRS respondents who provided valid responses to special module questions about cohort subjective survival forecasts and revised subjective survival forecasts. N 0 1,348. We compute standard errors (in parentheses) for all estimated quantities using a bootstrap procedure with 500 replications. See the fifth section of the article for more details on the latent factor model described by Eqs. (9)-(11).
to survey enumerators. Much of the previous research on SSFs has speculated that they are more useful than actuarial forecasts because SSFs contain information about one's own mortality risk, which is necessarily absent from actuarial forecasts. However, the estimates in Table 4 suggest that SSFs incorporate a great deal of random error that arguably swamps the information contained in d i . This is likely a key reason why actuarial survival forecasts outperform SSFs for predicting actual survival.
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Conclusions A host of recent research, both theoretical and empirical, has emphasized the importance of individuals' subjective survival forecasts for predicting mortality and behavior. Most prominently, Perozek (2008) suggested that SSFs perform better than population life tables in predicting age-and gender-specific mortality rates. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), I present a contrarian view. HRS respondents younger than 65 are pessimistic about their short-term survival prospects, and this pessimism has grown over time: in spite of steady increases in survival and longevity, subjective forecasts of survival to age 75 did not increase from 1992 to 2006. More importantly, SSFs predict in-sample survival rates that compare poorly with population life tables. The poor performance of subjective forecasts in explaining in-sample survival stems largely from "flatness bias," the tendency for individuals to understate the likelihood of living to relatively young ages while overstating the likelihood of living to ages beyond 80. In the HRS, flatness bias is sufficiently strong that it suggests that most individuals, at a given point in time, do not recognize that mortality risk increases with age.
To investigate the mechanisms underlying the poor performance of the SSFs, I develop and estimate a latent-factor model of the process by which individuals form subjective forecasts. Individuals' beliefs about their peers' survival prospects, as measured in a supplemental module in the 2006 HRS, are crucial for the identification of this model's parameters. The resulting estimates suggest that the SSFs incorporate several sources of error that, in combination, overwhelm the useful information they convey. Specifically, relative to actuarial survival forecasts, roughly two-thirds of the excess variation in the SSFs represents errors in guessing survival probabilities and response noise, rather than genuine information about an individual's health and survival prospects.
In spite of my largely negative conclusions, I envision an important role for additional research on SSFs. Future work will likely focus on improvements in data 18 Noise in SSFs also plays a large role in the results of Table 2 , which shows that actuarial forecasts outperform SSFs in models of in-sample survival. As Eq. (10) shows, SSFs net of actuarial forecasts (SSF i -A i ) equal g i + d i + e i , so the coefficient on SSF i in a linear regression of survival (Y i ) on SSF i and A i will converge to cov(Y i , g i + d i + e i ) / var(g i + d i + e i ). If g i and e i are unrelated to actual survival, one can use the estimates in Table 4 to recover cov(Y i , d i ) / var(d i ), which is the coefficient on SSF i in this regression if SSFs included no errors (ignoring that the models underlying Table 2 Table 2 would roughly triple in magnitude if var(g i ) 0 var(e i ) 0 0. I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these ideas and bias corrections. collection techniques intended to increase the reliability of these measures. The HRS questions designed to elicit cohort survival forecasts represent innovative examples of such techniques. Future research will also investigate why SSFs predict group-level mortality so poorly. The payoff of such an investigation is potentially large: published life tables have systematically underpredicted the longevity of successive cohorts for more than a century, so subjective forecasts have the potential to greatly improve the accuracy of longevity projections. Although my results suggest that this potential is largely unfulfilled in the HRS, researchers will continue to analyze SSFs because accurate longevity forecasts are crucially important for the optimal design of policies such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Notes: For ages 60-65, the initial year refers to 1996 and the target year refers to 2006. For ages 70-85, the initial year refers to 1993 and the target year refers to 2004. Rows in bold are initial ages for which living respondents reach their target age in the target year. For example, sample members aged 65 in 1996 were asked about the probability of living to age 75 (i.e., of living to the year 2006). All probabilities are converted to a 0-100 scale, with 0 meaning "no chance" and 100 meaning "absolutely certain."
